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Introduction
Nativist/nationalist discourses have been on the rise in the European sphere in recent de-
cades. Wodak and colleagues in their 
large scale edited volume bring togeth-
er a variety of Western/European case 
studies of right wing populist parties/
movements and discourses and warn 
against the rising trends of such views 
in Europe.1 These studies range from 
discussing the theoretical foundations 
and conceptualization of the nature of 
populist rhetoric to explaining the un-
precedented changes in the working 
class electorates and their economic 
grievances in several European coun-
tries. In the years following the pub-
lication of the book, a new wave of 
right wing populist parties and groups 
across Europe have made significant 
inroads in popular support, be it in the 
form of entering the structure of gov-
ernments or making significant gains 
in their vote shares. Most of these 
populist discourses are characterized 
in terms of their vociferous claims to 
being anti-establishment, anti-elitist 
and anti-globalization. These calls are 
made within a Western context where 
economic globalization and global 
capitalist movement have been the 
order of the day in politics within the 
last decades. 
The right wing populism discourses 
are characterized in a set of common 
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and recurring discursive strategies, 
albeit in varying degrees of intensity 
and scale. Firstly, there is the call for 
a swift and radical shift from a global-
ization rationale towards a national 
and nativist politics. This discursive 
strategy criticizes the normalized 
economic politics in the West i.e. eco-
nomic liberalism, free movement of 
capital and labor, and deregulation of 
financial markets –even though, all 
these are reduced to an anti-immi-
gration rhetoric in populist discourse. 
In doing so, the right wing populist 
discourse deliberately collates the 
economic globalization –that is neo-
liberalism at the global level, with so-
cio-cultural globalization that is com-
prised of supra-national regulatory 
practices on environmental laws, ju-
diciary and human rights regulation, 
standardization of labor conditions 
etc., as well as trade laws. It is within 
this very amalgamation that right 
wing populism can take on an overtly 
anti-global, anti-diversity and simply 
xenophobic overtone. In many ways, 
the populist discourse equates the per-
ceived disastrous economic realities 
with the perceived encouragement of 
more immigration and diversity. This 
is most acutely realized in areas of the 
country where economic globaliza-
tion and financialization of politics 
have hit the hardest. Extreme econo-
mization of politics views poorer sec-
tions of society as unimportant layers 
of social order and hence it is bound 
to leave them behind in its obsession 
with economic growth indexes rather 
than distribution of wealth and op-
portunities. The profiles of the Brexit 
vote in Britain and the U.S. presiden-
tial election in 2016 show that sizable 
sections of working class have casted 
their protest vote in favor of a shakeup 
in an attempt to presumably reclaim 
lost power of the ‘ordinary,’ marginal, 
rural, poorer, local populations from 
the dominance of the elite, central, 
urban, cosmopolitan, richer popula-
tions. During the course of the Brexit 
campaign, the leading figures in the 
Leave camp –themselves rich estab-
lishment figures– quickly figured out 
that it is by capitalizing on this mis-
guided understanding of immigra-
tion and globalization that they can 
win the Brexit vote hence they de-
liberately concentrated on reducing/
simplifying the referendum vote to a 
question of immigration. The deliber-
ate alignment of economic grievances 
of certain disenfranchised electorates 
culminated in a Brexit vote platform 
which had already turned into a xe-
nophobic platform. Within a populist 
frame, the Leave campaign managed 
to reduce the British EU referendum 
debates into predominately a matter 
of social and cultural changes and 
perceptions of immigration albeit 
Within a populist frame, the 
Leave campaign managed 
to reduce the British EU 
referendum debates into 
predominately a matter of 
social and cultural changes and 
perceptions of immigration 
albeit within an intentional 
truncated manner
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within an intentional truncated man-
ner. The gist of the matter is that the 
erosion of real distinctions between 
mainstream parties in British/Euro-
pean politics i.e. neoliberalism as an 
uncontested assumption, has height-
ened fears of immigration.2 This has 
paved the ground for the rise of right 
wing populist discourses which effec-
tively appeal to what has been a tradi-
tional support camp for the ‘left.’3
Hyper-normalized Economic 
Order
British nationalism has been in play 
throughout contemporary history4 
from colonialism, World Wars, to EU 
formation and the Brexit vote. Yet, 
the recent rise/success of British xe-
nophobic nationalism relates more 
directly to recent context of global 
geopolitics, economic concerns and 
broadly speaking a democratic defi-
cit of late-modern democracies in the 
global North. Instead of finger point-
ing and demonizing certain elec-
torates, e.g. lower classes, the issue 
should be looked into in terms of the 
processes which may have led to this 
vote among various electorates in-
cluding the working class vote. The 
formation and meaningful resonance 
of parties and movements such as 
UKIP and Brexit campaign can be 
viewed as a failure in effective dem-
ocratic process in empowering dis-
gruntled economic classes through 
meaningful representation. When 
(neoliberal) economy is religiously 
taken as an all-encompassing rational 
basis of politics then it is only logical 
to consider political demonstrations 
such as the Brexit vote as a product 
of such economic policies in return. 
What goes around comes around. 
Rather than doing that, the economic 
establishment tends to redirect the 
protest vote away from economic 
grievance and associate it to cultural 
and social trends within that particu-
lar community i.e. blaming the vote 
to racism of working classes and ef-
fectively perpetuating the classist dis-
course; two birds with one stone. 
Despite the crucial differences in so-
cial fabrics and political practices in 
global contexts, the breeding ground, 
characteristics and discursive strate-
gies of populist nationalist discourses 
have striking similarities. In essence, 
populist nationalist discourse pivots 
around a real or constructed problem 
in the social, economic and political 
status quo. It revolves around discur-
sive construction of a homogenously 
perceived Self, e.g. Us (the British), 
vs. a homogenously perceived Other, 
e.g. Them (the immigrants, Mus-
lims5 or by extension EU nationals). 
Nevertheless, the core message is 
nationalistic.6 Such discourses often 
‘fill the gap created by the public’s 
disenchantment with [official] pol-
itics’7 while presenting themselves 
as the indigenous, socially relevant, 
and righteous alternative to world-
views of the establishment. Nation-
alist rhetoric is overtly preoccupied 
with the notion of (re)gaining the 
(lost) power to actualize a roman-
ticized perception of the past. The 
perception of powerlessness is cen-
tral to nativist discourses not only in 
the structurally ‘democratic’ societies 
(e.g. Britain) but also in the extreme 
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identity politics at play in developing 
countries (e.g. Iran), which have gone 
through some forms of European 
colonization. While the democratic 
deficit in the late modern contexts 
may have arisen due to dominance of 
neoliberalism and its argued lack of 
relevance to certain electorates, many 
countries in the global South suffer 
from structural authoritarian poli-
tics leading to structural democratic 
deficit. While these contexts are ad-
mittedly different in terms of domes-
tic mark up, in one way or another, 
in both cases nativist discourses are 
founded upon a form of outcry for a 
radical change by taking back con-
trol, bringing back the glories, and 
restoring a constructed perfect past.8 
The leading argument here is that the 
global neoliberal North suffers from 
a degree of democratic deficit in its 
democratic practice. The main unre-
solved challenge is to operate within 
an egalitarian model of development 
in which justice and fair distribution 
of wealth and power are equally im-
portant in the long term imaginary of 
a developed nation-state. The deficit 
comes about by obsession with typical 
indexes of economic growth and as-
signing a pivotal role to markets and 
any processes whereby growth can 
be achieved. From a neoliberal point 
of view, globalization is practically 
a facilitated flow of goods, services 
and labor within markets, dictated by 
market values/economic drive and for 
the benefit of the markets. The eco-
nomic drive is the essence of identity 
of the parties on the right (e.g. Con-
servative Party in the UK) as it is the 
main tenant of their world imagery 
within the condition that everything 
else is ruthlessly deemed to be ex-
pendable. This, in the context of UK 
for example, has been the justification 
for austerity measures after the global 
economic crisis of 2008 –which by the 
Three far-right 
political figures 
(L to R: Geert 
Wilders, the 
Netherlands; 
Frauke Petry, 
Germany; 
Marine Le Pen, 
France) give a 
press conference 
in Koblenz, 
Germany, on 
January 21, 2017. 
AFP PHOTO / 
ROBERTO PFEIL
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way was brought about not by people 
those whose life quality is now being 
squeezed by austerity, but, by the eco-
nomic players at the top of the food 
chain. Similarly, a neoliberal argu-
ment has been used for justifying the 
move away from welfare society in 
which public service is increasingly 
curtailed for the benefit of reviving a 
neoliberal notion of growth. The new 
austerity measures have been directly 
impacting lower classes who have al-
ways been more in need for these ser-
vices in the first place. In other words, 
the adopted remedy for the crisis, i.e. 
austerity, has disenfranchised these 
classes even more than before. These 
groups of citizens gradually view 
themselves as left behind indigenous 
population while at the same time 
witnessing a rapid change of their im-
mediate environment to the benefit 
of global migratory flows. While the 
perception of disempowerment grows 
among the lower classes, the new mi-
grants, mainly from Europe in the 
case of UK, seem to be supported and 
encouraged by the establishment pol-
itics –a perception which is wrong at 
its core but it is deliberately reiterated. 
The capitalist politics, of course, is not 
essentially interested in diversity and/
or migration in the first place. That 
is, it does not for example believe in 
a humanist argument of giving ev-
erybody a chance but it simply stands 
in favor of what is seen as a process 
which helps the market and economic 
growth indexes; migrants not as hu-
mans but as market labor. As such, 
the center right politics maintains a 
generally xenophobic and class based 
rhetoric regarding migration. It is in 
practice content with the economic 
rationale of globalized immigration, 
work place deregulations, and out-
sourcing industries. It does not neces-
sarily view the migrants as equal citi-
zens in the country. In the meantime, 
the center right maintains an inher-
ently class based politics in which the 
government/state is merely viewed as 
an apparatus to serve the market even 
at the expense of the poor. The right 
wing politics believes in the markets 
and market values as the overarching 
leading principle in governance, life 
and society. Such a view is at ease in 
classification of citizens into those 
they see as relevant players and those 
that they see as unproductive, be it 
those who may need state support, 
e.g. disabled citizens or lower classes 
in precarious job situations, or God 
forbid migrants with slightly less pro-
ductivity than 100 percent. Economic 
globalization has also contributed to 
establishing market values and prac-
tices as the taken-for-granted norm 
in the global North. This is not about 
globalization in and by itself but about 
the way right center parties have ap-
Overwhelming individual 
marketing approach 
dismantles society as a 
collective and when it is  
applied to politics, it replaces 
the truths and facts with some 
kinds of validation of having 
your opinion as truth and 
facts
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propriated globalization to disguise 
their class based ideology and justify 
their anti-welfare policies. Through 
these two overlapping aspects, migra-
tion is semiotized as the evidence and 
source of policies which have harmed 
many lower classes in Western soci-
eties; a misguided grievance which is 
not only strategically cultivated by the 
establishment politics but also by the 
mainstream media apparatus of neo-
liberal contexts.
The key question is to ask why the 
lower classes, which have been dam-
aged by the global Western trends of 
right or center right capitalist poli-
cies, have in turn come out in support 
of more extreme right wing politics. 
This, in fact, is the key factor in the 
rise of populist politics in the West. 
This is evidence to recent failings of 
the established left in politics, and 
their elitism as well as the triumph 
of hegemony of capitalism which has 
changed it from an ideology to a nat-
ural order of governance in the global 
North and indeed around the globe. 
This is where explanations should 
be provided in terms of the mecha-
nisms through which the traditional 
left electorates e.g. Labour Party in 
UK or in Sweden have voted in fa-
vor of center right politicians or have 
completely swung to vote for fringe 
parties with very outspoken anti-im-
migration, racist, and anti-global slo-
gans. This is the era of a new identity 
politics, which reaps the results of 
years of naturalization of a certain 
economic model, substantiated by a 
deliberately misplaced real grievance. 
 
The fact is that within the last few 
decades the whole spectrum of main-
stream official politics has moved in-
creasingly to the right in a way that 
the opportunities of real social dem-
ocratic politics have diminished sig-
nificantly. As far as the economy is 
concerned there has been no radical 
difference between the so called right 
and left side of the political spectrum. 
In the case of UK, the new labor 
movement of the 90s was successful 
to re-launch the left into power but in 
essence it viewed itself as a non-so-
cialist left. Yes, several progressive 
policies of the New Labour remained 
intact and initially it proved to be a 
fresh change away from a Tory pol-
itics of the time which had caused 
horrendous class conflicts and pur-
sued a severe capitalist agenda, but 
nonetheless, New Labour became the 
antithesis of a real left politics and 
what it should stand for. The New La-
bour was successful in three consecu-
tive general elections but towards the 
end it was evident that the party had 
nothing else to offer in the manner 
of difference. The global economic 
In many countries in the North, 
public sphere is ‘plagued by 
forces of commercialization 
and compromised corporate 
conglomerates’ which in effect 
work to turn all public sphere 
platforms into ‘a vehicle for 
capitalist hegemony and 
ideological reproduction’
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crisis of 2008 worked as a catalyst for 
which Labour got the blame (it did 
not really do much to stop it anyway) 
whereas the global economic crisis 
was and still is a doomed outcome 
of hegemonic dominance of market 
forces and cut-throat competition 
to sell financial products. Similar 
trends could be seen in other parts 
of the West in different degrees. In 
the U.S for example, there has never 
really been a viable left politics and 
the whole political spectrum is to 
the right of most of European polit-
ical scales. While the power would 
change hands to centrist aka increas-
ingly right leading parties, the cen-
tral thesis of a globalized, connected, 
market based capitalist politics is 
taken for granted in the structural 
politics of establishment. Trump’s 
vote was partly due to a perception 
of difference, which, as mentioned 
before, harvested the outcome of a 
deliberately misplaced real grievance.
The trend towards unquestionable 
capitalist rationale as the only norm 
and viable option of governance is also 
infused and relegated to all the other 
aspects of life-worlds of citizens. This 
is where the style, dynamic and logics 
of competition, economic derive and 
extreme individualism are taken up 
in provisions of goods and services 
and even worse, it permeantes into 
aspects of life-worlds which had not 
previously been viewed as a realm of 
neoliberal subjugation, e.g. educa-
tion, health care and life experience. 
It goes without saying that the main-
stream media have had a crucial hand 
in normalizing such practices while 
they themselves are being internally 
impacted by similar trends, e.g. in-
creasing reliance on advertising. This 
overwhelming individual marketing 
approach dismantles society as a col-
lective and when it is applied to pol-
itics, it replaces the truths and facts 
with some kinds of validation of hav-
ing your opinion as truth and facts.9 
Post-politics
The hyper-normalization of a neo-
liberal life order has translated itself 
into approaches in political science 
and cultural studies which have 
started to do away with radical critic 
and turned into approaches which 
claim to pay attention to micro-level 
analysis of political communication, 
e.g. the rise of personal politics, in-
dividualistically oriented studies on 
behavior and affect theory of connec-
tion. Despite the fact that there is also 
critical work within this paradigm, 
a lot of these approaches do not re-
quire engagement, or are content to 
turn away from engaging, with the 
macro structural issues. Macro struc-
tural considerations would consider 
questions such as: why people act 
the way they do, or why personality 
and media management of public 
faces are increasingly becoming more 
important than policy and rational 
deliberation, why the electorates are 
weary of big politics discussions and 
young generations are disillusioned 
with politics, why large populations 
see politics as irrelevant to their life 
and in turn the sensitivities and pub-
lic knowledge around democratic 
structure, values, rights are falling, 
why university students do not show 
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significant interest in understanding 
the basics of democracy or the need 
for structural critique? 
This is where the notion of post-poli-
tics comes in to justify the shift by pos-
tulating that this is an era beyond pol-
itics and ideologies. It is argued that 
the contemporary moment of history 
is the new era when big ‘P’ politics is 
no longer relevant, mainly because 
nothing really changes in bringing 
this or that party to power. The pro-
cess of normalization of post-politi-
cal context is both a top-down macro 
and bottom-up micro process. The 
post-politics actively denies that the 
real politics is about policy, argumen-
tation and overarching principles and 
happily reduces it to media appear-
ance, likeability, psychological con-
nection and relatability in the context 
that the media industry vigorously 
continues to make advances in colo-
nizing the politics. One driving force 
and culmination of such post-ideo-
logical manipulation in practice is 
reflected and constituted in the logics 
and dynamic of interaction on Social 
Media and participatory web. 
Media Landscape and Politics
The two forces of traditional in-
trusive politics (coercive control of 
public domains e.g. censorship) and 
the capitalist colonization of public 
sphere are the main barriers to true 
democratization projects.10 They both 
pertain to the way public sphere is 
restricted in facilitating viable delib-
eration towards the general public’s 
interest i.e. diversity, equal represen-
tation, access and influence. In many 
countries in the North, public sphere 
is ‘plagued by forces of commercial-
ization and compromised corporate 
conglomerates’ which in effect work 
to turn all public sphere platforms 
into ‘a vehicle for capitalist hegemony 
and ideological reproduction.’11 In the 
meantime, a more traditional (visi-
bly) coercive exercise of hegemony 
and control is witnessed in many de-
veloping parts of the world. For ex-
ample, the debate about the role and 
function of media in the Middle East 
has always been a question of democ-
racy and the quality of public sphere 
‘as space for political contestations, 
counter-hegemonic struggles, and/or 
performance of identity.’12 
As such, issues of access to, quality, 
and viability of media use and tech-
nologies –as the main public sphere 
apparatus– are all political consider-
ations. In as much as public sphere 
is viewed as ‘a network for commu-
nicating information and points of 
view’ or ‘a realm of our social life’ 
Aspects pertaining to 
‘symbolic of social relations 
ordering’  are political as well 
as being inherently discursive. 
Any force that curtails, 
negatively influences, and 
manipulates the public sphere 
is a force contributing to a 
democratic deficit
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where some forms of public opinion 
can be formed,’13 it becomes a polit-
ical matter. In other words, aspects 
pertaining to ‘symbolic of social rela-
tions ordering’14 are political as well as 
being inherently discursive. Any force 
that curtails, negatively influences, and 
manipulates the public sphere is a force 
contributing to a democratic deficit. 
The above notions can be considered 
for both old/traditional mass media 
as well as new/participatory Social 
Media. Yet, the dynamic of discursive 
power and the interaction between the 
old and new media are radically differ-
ent.15 In the meantime, the trajectory 
of such notional changes in Social 
Media has affected norms of polit-
ical communication in general and 
political activism in particular. Now, 
‘ordinary’ users can be part of produc-
tion, consumption and distribution of 
content with few or no barriers in the 
form of traditional gate-keeping prac-
tices.16 With an oversimplified take on 
the democratization project, the per-
ception of free access has come to be 
celebrated as a new frontier for dem-
ocratic circulation of forms of media 
content; nevertheless, the potentials of 
the participatory web in civil, political 
and social mobilization cannot be cat-
egorically dismissed.17 It is a fact that 
various groups of ordinary to profes-
sional text producers, i.e. bloggers, fol-
lowers, raters, sharers, likers, as well as 
traditional journalists, form nodes in 
an information environment with the 
potential to organize themselves for 
various aims. This is not only about 
transferring content and values per se, 
but it is about being a site for formation 
and substantiation of these values, in-
formation and worldviews that is dis-
course. New Media technologies and 
communicative affordances continue 
to impact social and political fabrics of 
societies in (sometimes radically) dif-
ferent ways. Specifically, in the context 
of the Middle East, with (largely) re-
stricted public spheres,18 the commu-
nicative affordances of Social Media 
have provided opportunities for new 
forms of citizen activism, construction 
of alternative identities and delibera-
tions despite the contentious relations 
of political regimes with the new tech-
nology. The new technologies have 
(arguably) empowered ordinary civil-
ians to engage in political and cultural 
communications and to contribute to 
expression, formation and dissemina-
tion of discourses away from (usually 
closed) official channels.19
Broadly speaking, the developments in 
communication technologies –what 
have come to be called as technolo-
gies of the participatory web–20 have 
essentially altered the linear, one-to-
many dynamic of mass communica-
tion and posed various challenges for, 
in traditional assumptions, critical 
media studies such as media power, 
representation, dynamic of text pro-
duction/consumption, audience, etc.21 
In effect, Social Media communica-
tive model has brought together the 
distinct communicative paradigms 
of Interpersonal communication –
into the realm of linguistic analysis, 
and Mass communication –into the 
realm of Media Studies.22 As such So-
cial Media communication is referred 
to as ‘any electronically mediated 
communicative practice across plat-
forms, spaces, sites, and technologies 
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in which users can: (i) work together 
in producing and compiling content; 
(ii) perform interpersonal commu-
nication and mass communication 
simultaneously or separately and; (iii) 
have access to see and respond to in-
stitutionally (e.g. newspaper articles) 
or user‐generated content/texts.’23 
This would then include obvious So-
cial Networking Sites (SNSs) such 
as Facebook and Instagram; websites 
which are focused on crowd sourc-
ing content e.g. Wikipedia, electronic 
forums etc.; micro/blogging sites e.g. 
Tumblr and Twitter; and Instant Mes-
saging Apps with the possibility of 
creating group communication such 
as WhatsApp and Telegram. 
Social Media and Echo Chambers
The new surge in right wing popu-
lism is not characterized by ‘a strong 
structure, and organized movement, 
or a dense party organization,’24 e.g. 
a form of ethno-nationalist identity. 
Populism is the realm of media savvy 
political performers who make color-
ful claims to grass root mobilization 
among formerly voiceless ordinary 
members of the society. Despite being 
anti-(democratic) establishment, the 
new far right argues from a (truncated 
form of) popular democratic perspec-
tive devoid of philosophical compli-
cations of foundations of democratic 
principles. Incidentally, media per-
formance, the claim to empowerment 
of ordinary citizens, re-connection 
with politics, grass-root mobilization 
also constitutes the core characteris-
tics of new digital media technologies 
which work with the logic of regimes 
of popularity building through ‘likes,’ 
‘shares’ and ‘followers,’ etc. Personal-
ity politics on Social Media not only 
feed into a highly simplified equation 
A protestor 
holds a placard 
during an anti-EU 
demonstration 
outside the Houses 
of Parliament 
in London, on 
November 23, 
2016. 
AFP PHOTO / 
BEN STANSALL
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of popularity and legitimacy but at 
the same time act as a revolt against 
the perceived monolithic nature of 
traditional mass media. In contrast 
to the rigidity of mass media in terms 
of their monopoly over discursive 
power, the nature, location and dy-
namic of discursive power in Social 
Media or broadly speaking partici-
patory web is fluid, changeable, and 
circular25 in a way that users are at the 
same time, producers, consumers and 
distributors of the content. Although, 
the utopian hopes for enhancement 
of the real public deliberation via the 
Social Media and democratization 
of public sphere has not material-
ized, these platforms can still play a 
significant role for niche politics and 
non-mainstream representations in-
cluding exclusionary nationalist dis-
courses and inherently undemocratic 
rhetoric.26 The fact remains that given 
the nature of populist nationalist dis-
course and strategies, the new digital 
participatory technology is an apt 
space for construction, promotion 
and dissemination of exclusionary 
nationalist discourses across geopo-
litical contexts.
The main argument here is to note 
that the new communication tech-
nologies of participatory web and 
their new affordances of interactivity 
and potential for direct democratic 
vs. representational democratic par-
ticipation have not caused the current 
shift to right wing populist trend in 
Europe for that matter. As explained 
above, the shift has its own roots in 
structural democratic deficit, i.e. 
socio-political contexts of relevant 
societies. Nonetheless, the values 
and processes at work in Social Me-
dia spaces, the political economy of 
platforms, and their assumption of 
post-ideological era and obsoleteness 
of critical politics are completely in 
line for promoting affective-driven, 
anti-establishment, and fringe pol-
itics. Such politics is not built upon 
argumentation, i.e. rational deliber-
ation in the Habermasian sense, but 
it is largely based on affective com-
munication which foregrounds what 
individuals feel, believe and like over 
facts, arguments and logics. The tech-
nology has eroded the practice of 
rational debate and turned it into a 
popularity contest. This technology 
encourages filter bubbles and echo 
chambers which work to form groups 
of like-minded members and keeps 
these groups away from meaningful 
interactions even among themselves.
In the meantime, the extreme indi-
viduation, and the central logic of 
equating visibility/popularity with le-
gitimacy in Social Media, along with 
The new  communication 
technologies of participatory 
web and their new affordances 
of interactivity and potential 
for direct democratic vs. 
representational democratic 
participation have not caused 
the current shift to right wing 
populist trend in Europe for 
that matter
MAJID KHOSRAVINIKCOMMENTARY
64 Insight Turkey
the corporate algorithmic manipu-
lation of news feeds create a fertile 
ground for populist perception and 
communication. These characteris-
tics of Social Media communication 
are responsible elements in creating 
echo chambers whereby the archi-
tecture of the media tends to favor 
and encourages like-mindedness and 
intensification of feelings and beliefs 
with little or no critical scrutiny. This 
is not necessarily the overarching aim 
that the Social Media platform own-
ers directly pursue but a natural side 
effect of their operations. The leading 
core principle for Social Media oper-
ation is to increase media consump-
tion. The more users consume, engage 
with, and contribute to the platform, 
the more there is added value for the 
platform. On the one hand, the users’ 
use of media turns them into a mem-
ber of the audience for various kinds 
of advertisements directed at them 
and as such increases the value of 
the platform. On the other hand, any 
form of engagement, use, interaction, 
contribution, sharing content/infor-
mation, linking etc. is considered the 
trade currency. All these are used for 
commercial purposes e.g. for more 
precision targeted advertising, dis-
tribution of advertising content, and 
various market research operations. 
As such, these platforms constantly 
seek solutions to enhance use and 
contributions from users. This is the 
guiding force for various kinds of al-
gorithmic rearrangement of the con-
tent visible to individual users. For 
example, the Facebook news feed of 
every individual is catered around 
the ‘knowledge’ that the platform 
has already gathered on the user and 
the predictions it can make about 
their political views, interests, issues, 
vulnerabilities, belief system etc. As 
such, the platform works based on 
the principle of relevance rather than 
significance. That is, the platform 
shows the user what it predicts to be 
liked or interesting or relevant to the 
user rather than following a public 
service logic of delivering news to 
the public in terms of reflecting the 
world out there to the whole public. 
By taking into account the dominant 
affective mode of communication, 
likeminded users would predom-
inantly see each other’s reactions, 
news, links, commentaries; a process 
which would lead to echo chambers 
and intensification of the belief sys-
tem. Echo chambers are natural con-
sequences of the way Social Media 
are commercially designed. All forms 
of interactions on Social Media func-
tion as a form of promotion of that 
content. Whether it is ‘liking,’ ‘com-
menting,’ ‘sharing,’ or ‘tagging,’ they 
all help that content to become more 
important and get more exposure. It 
is natural if we avoid engaging with 
views that we do not like hence there 
is a technological design with a con-
Echo chambers are natural 
consequences of the way 
Social Media are commercially 
designed. All forms of 
interactions on Social 
Media function as a form of 
promotion of that content
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sequence of echo chambers. This is 
also due to dominance of economic 
logic on digital spaces, otherwise, the 
participatory web could also be used 
as a public sphere for deliberation or 
expression of suppressed identities. 
Echo chambers are not about new 
ideas or (critical) perspectives, they 
are about how well or effectively the 
group members reiterate the same 
idea/belief. Hence, the result is inten-
sification of belief system at best. At 
the same time, critical speculations 
and other ways of seeing the situation 
and critical engagement are normally 
kept out via the natural operation 
of Social Media algorithms and the 
way these platforms nudge users to 
behave –unless of course, the user 
makes a conscious and constant ef-
fort to reshuffle their membership of 
networked publics. Social Media are 
unpredictable in terms of where and 
what something becomes a sensation. 
There is a strong dynamic of snow-
balling. Many Social Media platforms 
work based on user’s behaviors and 
reactions and when something at-
tracts certain numbers of ‘likes,’ ‘com-
ments,’ ‘interactions,’ ‘sharing,’ etc. it 
becomes visible to large groups of us-
ers and then it may snowball to dom-
inate the whole net for some time. 
Throughout this process, there is no 
gate keeping or fact checking mech-
anism. In other words, the news, 
which may have become the biggest 
sensation on the net, could easily be 
false or completely fabricated. Social 
Media are about visibility/popularity 
not facts. Yet many users and ordi-
nary public automatically equate visi-
bility/popularity of a piece of news to 
its credibility. This is simply how So-
cial Media could become a breeding 
ground for false news. The essence of 
Social Media is creditability gained 
by visibility/popularity as popularity 
equates commercial gain regardless 
of the consequences. This may work 
fine within commercial domains but 
when a similar logic is applied to the 
sphere of politics the results could be 
disastrous. In other words, Social Me-
dia could actually function as spaces 
for democratic practice but the market 
logic and dominance of commercial 
rationality has diminished this poten-
tial and in many cases destroyed this 
capacity. Obviously, these effects are 
different in different Social Media 
platforms, e.g. Facebook as compared 
to Twitter but nevertheless, the cen-
tral logic of corporatized participa-
tory web is the same. Once again this 
is about colonization of what could 
be assumed to be the public sphere 
by corporate forces and some form of 
market economy, which is plaguing 
the ideal potential of the New Media 
spaces. This is the same force, which 
is an increasing threat to traditional 
mass media as well.
The algorithmic surveillance of So-
cial Media is not an ideological ma-
chine in the traditional sense, i.e. it 
is mainly automatic and machine 
controlled whereby human factor 
does not normally interfere with 
the regimentation. The New Media 
technology literature is full of un-
dertones of claims to post-ideolog-
ical era. In many trends of thoughts 
even notions like ideology, discourse 
and representations are cast aside as 
being irrelevant notions in the study 
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of New Media technology. However, 
the claim to post-ideology is already 
a strictly ideological stance in its core. 
In most cases this is about assuming 
the triumph of market economy and 
neoliberalism over all aspects of so-
cial and personal life including media 
technologies. Post-ideology thesis, in 
the meantime, trivializes the demo-
cratic struggles and values in a way 
that the whole democratization proj-
ect is deliberately and misleadingly 
reduced to some kind of opinion 
gathering mechanism. This is a su-
per-simplified understanding of de-
mocracy, i.e. reducing down to a poll 
system, regardless of the core values 
which had informed the original 
thoughts of democracy and enlight-
enment. In many ways, Social Media 
sensations are inherently populist 
phenomenon. This is not a problem 
in and by itself but the permeation of 
the principle of visibility-equals-le-
gitimacy and the claim that Social 
Media are empowering the voiceless 
can have counterparts in structural 
politics of populism in which the 
populists predominately make an-
ti-establishment claims, disregard for 
norms and values inherent in democ-
racies and usually make pledges to 
overthrow the system in the benefit 
of ‘the real people.’ The problem is not 
in the practice, it is about the philo-
sophical essence that Social Media 
implicitly push forward. You could 
argue that democracy is about gain-
ing popularity which is right but the 
point which is always missed is that 
democracy is not JUST about gaining 
popularity, it is about having a viable 
apparatus for rational argumentation 
and expression of all ideas. It is about 
having systems of fact checking and 
accountability, division of powers, an-
chorage to central civil principles, etc. 
Social Media seem to have removed 
all requirements of democracy and 
dangerously reduced it to a game of 
gaining popularity at any cost. In that 
sense, Social Media politics has cre-
ated a fertile space of growth of pop-
ulist politics or haphazard populism 
in every sense. Trumps’ performance 
in the U.S. is a prime example of this 
trend, not only in terms of his popu-
list right wing views and the typical 
strategic misplacements of working 
class grievances, but also in terms of 
the obsession he displays with the use 
of Social Media and the fact that he 
has literally reduced the entirety of 
actual political practice into a form of 
Social Media use.
Conclusion
Social Media are characterized as 
the realm of affects, connections and 
personal sharing. In turn, it is argued 
that it is now the age of affective pol-
itics that is, the age of prioritizing 
feelings over facts. It is the age where 
rationality takes a back seat in favor 
of relationality. New digital media are 
not the cause of this turn. There are 
Social Media politics has 
created a fertile space of 
growth of populist politics or 
haphazard populism in every 
sense
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sociological and cultural reasons for 
such a turn towards favoring pop-
ulism in the West. There are wider 
ontological shifts in politics and the 
world imagery which has caused this 
turn. Social Media are both the prod-
uct and at the same time perpetuator 
of such preference. That is why their 
guiding logic resonates with contem-
porary people. Social Media at the 
age of behavioral advertising are the 
epitome of preference of ‘relevance’ 
over ‘significance.’ Social Media are 
about YOUR life, what you like, 
what you feel and they cater towards 
what you prefer by constantly mon-
itoring your online behavior. This is 
of course done to maximize profit 
through targeted adverting and pro-
motions. Social Media do not show 
you the world out there, they con-
struct a world to your liking and as 
such they are a breeding ground for 
echo chambers, and constructions of 
filter bubbles where all like-minded 
people get together and reinforce 
their own perception of the realities 
and priorities rather than engaging 
with other views. And, everybody as-
sumes this is the world out there! 
Having said all the above, this is not 
to argue that Social Media have had 
a causal effect on the shift to right 
wing populism in the West. The rise 
of right wing populism (i.e. the sup-
port from the underclass) is basically 
a protest against normalization of 
neoliberal economy, economic glo-
balization, pursuit of growth, disre-
garding issues around distribution 
of wealth and the constant normal-
ization of such practices in the West 
which has caused a democratic defi-
cit in the West. The hyper-normaliza-
tion of neoliberal values along with 
deliberate misinformation, tapping 
into nationalism, anti-immigration 
rhetoric of the incumbent govern-
ments and the change in traditional 
class divisions have led into a sort of 
exodus of the traditional electorate 
from the traditional left camp to the 
extreme right of center parties. While 
the global neoliberal forces reap the 
benefits of labor based migration, 
outsourcing industries, etc. and in 
practice encourage it, at the rhetoric 
and discourse level, immigration and 
outsourcing gets the blame for the in-
equalities, and disenfranchisement of 
lower layers of social classes. This is 
why a twisted single issue (anti-im-
migration) party on the extreme right 
would pretty much appeal to many 
disgruntled communities. 
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